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Abstract 
Authors have argued that counterterrorism must be consistent with “the rule of law.” Often 
associated with this approach is the assumption that plural political structures limit the state’s 
response to terrorism and that state agents will be held accountable if their response is excessive. 
Scholars who focus on social movements reject this assumption..  We examine the state’s 
response to anti-state violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1994.  In 1982, Sinn Féin 
did much better than expected in an election to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Following the 
election, it is alleged that state agents followed a “shoot-to-kill” policy and shot dead Irish 
republican paramilitaries instead of arresting them.  We find evidence suggesting such a policy 
and consider the implications.  
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When responding to “terrorism”, democratic states face the dilemma of defending themselves 
without “destroying the values for which they stand” (Ignatief 2004, p. vii; Merom 2003).  
Indeed, several authors have argued that the state’s response to terrorism must be consistent with 
“the rule of law”: that counterterrorism should be rooted in a justice system with checks and 
balances that protect everyone, including anti-state activists who deny the legitimacy of legal 
structures designed to protect even their civil liberties (Chalk 1995; Pedahzur and Ranstorp 
2001; Wilkinson 2006: 61-94; see also Kalyvas 2003). 
 In contrast, social movement theories reject the assumption that liberal democracies are 
governed by plural political systems that guarantee due process for everyone. As Davenport and 
Inman have commented, “when authorities are challenged with some form of conflict, they 
engage in some form of repressive action—simply, threatened governments normally respond 
with force” (2012: 622; see also, Davenport, 1995; Gamson 1990 [1975]; Gurr, 1988; Tilly 1978; 
Alimi, Demetriou, and Bosi 2015; Earl 2011; Lichbach 1987; Khawaja 1993; White and White 
1995; Rasler 1996).    
 Scholars generally agree that democracies have a complex set of repertoires with which 
to respond to challenges. These include accommodative means that allow for participation and 
contestation (Gurr 1988, p. 54; Davenport 2007, p. 11).  In democracies, leaders are under more 
scrutiny as an independent press can publicize illegitimate uses of force and they may be voted 
out of office.  Democratic leaders also must worry about the cost of using inappropriate 
repressive measures that lead to public outrage—the “backfire” effect of repression (Hess and 
Martin, 2006).  They must employ tactics that demobilize movements while simultaneously 
mitigating or eliminating backfire effects (Smithey and Kurtz 2018, p. 185).    
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 Smithey and Kurtz (2018) argue that elites have a continuum of repressive tactics 
available to them, ranging from violent sanctions that induce fear among challengers to 
persuasive inducements that increase the chances that challengers will internalize a regime’s 
legitimacy (p. 190).  The response to a domestic threat will depend on many factors, including 
the type of the challenge, the identity of the challengers, the challengers’ goals, and the regime 
type.  Lethal force is but one of the many tactics leaders may use to repress opposition.  We 
investigate the possibility that a liberal democracy, when threatened, and like its more 
authoritarian counterparts, will systematically employ lethal force against its own citizens.  The 
following is a case study of state violence against Irish republican paramilitaries—“terrorists”—
in Northern Ireland.1   
 
CONTEXT 
Between 1969 and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, more than 3,600 people were killed by 
political violence in Northern Ireland (White 2017).  Broadly, there were three actors in the 
conflict: anti-state Irish republican paramilitaries, pro-state loyalist paramilitaries, and the 
security forces (such as, the British Army and the Northern Irish police, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC).  The “Provisional” Irish Republican Army (IRA) was responsible for 
almost 1,800 fatalities, including more than 900 members of the security forces and 500 civilians 
(of whom approximately 350 were Protestants).  Other republican paramilitary organizations 
active during these years include the “Official” IRA, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), 
the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), and the “Continuity” IRA.  Loyalist 
paramilitaries were responsible for almost 1,000 fatalities, and most of their victims were 
civilians (650 Catholic and 120 Protestant; McKittrick, et al. 2004). 
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 In general, there was “strategic consistency” in the approach of successive British 
governments that acknowledged a political dimension to the violence, but also viewed it as 
criminal behavior (Cunningham 2001, p. 155).  This approach was rooted in past practice 
(including the British response to previous insurgencies in Ireland and in colonial settings), 
interacted with the republican paramilitary campaign, and included security-based and 
politically-based initiatives (see Bell 1976; Barkan 1984; McAdam 1983; Neumann 2003; Smith 
1995).  For example, in 1971 internment without trial was introduced in Northern Ireland for the 
fourth time in the 20th century (Beggan 2006; Bell 1993; De Fazio 2018).  These efforts were 
complemented by political initiatives that included negotiations with various Irish governments, 
the Sunningdale Agreement (1973), which led to the brief establishment of communal power-
sharing (1973-74), and a Provisional IRA-British truce in 1975 (English 2003; Ó Dochartaigh 
2015).  Over time the security forces became more sophisticated and discerning (see Table 3).  
Paramilitaries also adapted.  In 1976-77, the Provisional IRA reorganized for a “Long War” 
strategy.  They scaled back their bombing campaign, embraced a smaller and more secure 
cellular structure, and adopted a “total strategy” of coordinated military and political activity 
(Smith 1995: 110-12; 152-161; English 2003; Moloney 2007: 175-8; see also Morgan and Smith 
2016; White 2017). 
 In directly confronting terrorism, the security forces were more aggressive against anti-
state republican paramilitaries than they were pro-state loyalist paramilitaries, and also killed a 
large number of civilians.  McKittrick et al. (2004Table 18) report that between 1969 and 1998, 
British soldiers killed 301 people, including 121 republican versus 10 loyalist paramilitaries, and 
138 Catholic versus 20 Protestant civilians.  They also   report (Table 19) that the RUC killed 52 
people, including 15 republican versus five loyalist paramilitaries, and 26 Catholic versus three 
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Protestant civilians.2 Police officers and soldiers were subject to rules of engagement but in 
several instances were prosecuted for the excessive use of force, including four soldiers found 
guilty of murdering civilians. 
 Our focus is on an apparent change in the republican paramilitary-security force dynamic 
in the early 1980s.  We address the development of an alleged shoot-to-kill policy, directed 




On 1 March 1976, “special category status” for paramilitary prisoners was ended..  The Irish 
republican protest against their “criminalization” peaked in 1981 when ten prisoners fasted to 
death in an attempt to force the British into conceding political status (Kirkpatrick 2018a; 2018b; 
O’Hearn 2006).  Although the prisoners failed to win immediate concessions, the support 
mobilized outside of the prison was much greater than expected.  In a Northern Ireland by-
election, hunger-striker Bobby Sands was elected the MP for Fermanagh/South Tyrone; his 
subsequent funeral drew an estimated 100,000 people.  In June 1981, two IRA prisoners were 
elected to the Dublin parliament, contributing to a change in government. In the wake of the 
hunger strike, the republican movement as a whole experienced a large-scale mobilization, 
especially the Provisional IRA and its political wing, Sinn Féin.   
 To counter the hunger strike mobilization and support the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP), the moderate Catholic/nationalist alternative to Sinn Féin, the British government 
sought to restore a government for Northern Ireland, beginning with an election to a new 
Northern Ireland Assembly in October 1982.  In order to register a protest vote, and after 
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pledging they would not take their seats in an illegitimate British assembly, Sinn Féin contested 
this election and received 64,191 first preference votes (10.1% of the total).  Of five Sinn Féin 
elected representatives (out of 78 total), three of them—Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, and 
Danny Morrison—were assumed to be leading members of the Provisional IRA (Moloney 2007).   
 The election was a watershed, opening a new front for the Provisionals in which IRA 
violence was complemented by Sinn Féin electoral politics.  Sinn Féin received 35% of the 
nationalist vote and suddenly threatened the moderate SDLP.  Fearing they would be outflanked, 
SDLP representatives also refused to take their seats in the Assembly, which was effectively 
scuttled.  Perhaps most important, the Sinn Féin vote demonstrated that the hunger strike 
mobilization had not faded. The possibility that Sinn Féin would eclipse the SDLP threatened the 
state’s counterterrorism campaign, posited on the argument that the paramilitaries were a 
criminal terrorist conspiracy with virtually no popular support.  In the words of Brendan O’Leary 
and John McGarry, “Sinn Féin’s breakthrough cast a dark shadow on British claims to neutrality: 
one third of the nationalist community supported a war to expel them from Northern Ireland” 
(O’Leary and McGarry 1993, p. 213; see also Neumann, 2003, p. 116; Patterson 1997, pp.194-
95; Smith 1995, p. 162). 
 This was the political context in which, on 11 November 1982, Seán Burns, Gervais 
McKerr, and Eugene Toman, three members of the Provisional IRA’s “North Armagh Brigade”, 
were shot dead by the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s E4A Special Support Unit.  Police officers 
claimed that the men killed had tried to drive through a roadblock.  Forensic evidence showed 
that the car was stationary when they were shot.  The fact that the paramilitaries were unarmed 
suggested to some that they had been executed.  This was the first of a series of alleged shoot-to-
kill incidents involving RUC and British army special covert operations units (see also Bew 
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2014). 
 Our investigation is two-fold.  First, we use quantitative data to test the hypothesis that 
following the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election there was a change in the nature of 
republican paramilitary-security force confrontations.3  Second, we present a chronological 
analysis of alleged shoot-to-kill incidents between 1982 and 1992.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Our data are primarily drawn from Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who 
Died As A Result Of the Northern Ireland Troubles (2004), written by journalists David 
McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, and Chris Thornton.  Lost Lives presents information 
on each victim, including the date and location of death and the organization that caused the 
death.4   
 Time Frame 
We examine the security force-republican paramilitary dynamic between the “Lower Falls 
Curfew” in Belfast, 3 July 1970, and the Provisional IRA’s ceasefire of August 1994. The curfew 
marks the beginning of direct conflict between republican paramilitaries and the security forces 
(Bell 1993).  The ceasefire marks the beginning of the end of the Provisionals’ military 
campaign.  Between July 1970 (our starting point) and November 1992, there were 106 incidents 
in which the security forces shot dead 140 republican paramilitaries and three civilians.  The 
youngest paramilitary shot dead was a thirteen-year-old member of Na Fianna Éireann, a youth 
group aligned with the Provisional IRA.  The oldest was 52 years of age.  The mean age of 
paramilitaries shot dead by the security forces was 23.  Of the 140 paramilitaries shot dead by the 
security forces, 108 were members of the Provisional IRA, ten were members of the Official 
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IRA, ten were members of Na Fianna Éireann, nine were members of the INLA, two were 
members of Cumann na mBan (an independent women’s organization), and one was a member 
of the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO).  The vast majority of the victims (136 of 




 More of these incidents (53) occurred in Belfast than in any other location (see Table 1).  
Combining with Derry city (16), just less than two thirds of the incidents occurred in urban areas 
(69/106=65%).  There was one international incident. On 6 March 1988, soldiers of the Special 
Air Service (SAS) shot dead three IRA members in Gibraltar.  The rest of the incidents were 
scattered among the small towns of Armagh, Downpatrick, Dungannon, Newry, and Strabane, 
and the rural areas of Counties Antrim, Armagh, Fermanagh, and Tyrone.  A multivariate 
analysis allows us to determine if there was a qualitative change in British counterterrorism 
following the 1982 Assembly election. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Dependent Variables  
British authorities have consistently denied that there was a shoot-to-kill policy in Northern 
Ireland.  Our measures are by necessity indirect and are in essence an attempt to assess the 
existence of a latent variable—that is, a shoot-to-kill policy implemented after the 1982 
Assembly election (Bollen 2002).6  We measure observable outcomes of an alleged shoot-to-kill 
policy.   
   If there was a shoot-to-kill policy, the evidence suggests it was implemented by the 
special operations branches of the security forces: the RUC’s E4A Special Support Unit, the 
British Army’s 14th Intelligence Unit, and the British Army’s Special Air Service (SAS).7  In 
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Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that Beat the IRA, William Matchett (2016) presents a 
“chronological list of all covert operations … that resulted in one or more fatality from 1974 to 
1992” (Matchett 2016, pp. 108, 198-205, 221-22).  Our first dependent variable is based on thirty 
covert incidents in which republican paramilitaries were shot dead.  This is a binary variable 
(1=covert operation; 0=all other incidents).8   
 Our second dependent variable is also binary and measures the number of paramilitaries 
shot dead in each incident (0=one paramilitary was killed; 1=two or more paramilitaries were 
killed).
9
  Under a shoot-to-kill policy, the emphasis would be on killing paramilitaries rather than 
arresting them. This should result in a significant increase in fatalities per incident.  In 86 of 106 
incidents, only one paramilitary was killed. The first incident with multiple fatalities occurred on 
23 October 1971.  Maura Meehan and Dorothy Maguire, sisters and members of Cumann na 
mBan, were driving through West Belfast and warning people that a raid was underway when 
they were shot dead by British soldiers.  The final incident with multiple victims occurred on 16 
February 1992 when four IRA members in County Tyrone, as described in Lost Lives, were 
killed “in a carefully planned SAS ambush.”  The most paramilitaries killed in any single 
incident occurred on 8 May 1987, when eight members of the Provisional IRA’s Tyrone Brigade 
were killed in an attack on a police station in Loughgall, County Armagh (McKittrick et al. 2004, 
pp. 107-108, 1077-80, 1280).    
Independent Variables  
Our key independent variable measures whether or not a given incident occurred before or after 
the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election (0=before the election; 1=after the election).  We 
control for the level of violence that preceded each incident, the geographic location of each 
incident, and the possibility that informers influenced security force operations. 
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 The number of people killed between incidents is an indicator of the level of paramilitary 
activity prior to a given incident.  We suspect that the more people killed between incidents, and 
the more members of the security forces killed between incidents, the more likely the security 
forces would respond with force.  We control for the total number of people killed between 
incidents and the number of security forces killed between incidents.  Because these variables are 
correlated, they are entered into separate equations.10  These variables should control for the 
possibility that periods of increased paramilitary activity, such as after the hunger strike, led to 
more aggression from the security forces.     
 A binary variable is used to indicate whether incidents occurred in the urban areas of 
Belfast and Derry city or the rural areas and small towns of Northern Ireland (1=urban; 
0=rural/small town).  This variable should capture differences in the republican paramilitary-
security force dynamic associated with urban versus rural guerrilla warfare/terrorism (e.g., 
Schultz 1978).  Finally, we control for 78 alleged informers killed by republican paramilitaries 
between 1972 and 1992.11  The loss of information provided by an alleged informer may have 
influenced the ability of the security forces to engage in counterterrorism.  Executing an informer 
may also have made it less likely that other informers would provide additional information to 
the security forces.  We anticipate that the more informers killed, the less likely there would be 
an incident. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 Table 2 presents the results of binomial logistic regression analyses on two dependent 
variables.  In Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is whether or not paramilitaries were shot 
dead in a covert operation (1=covert operation; 0=other incidents).  In Models 3 and 4, the 
dependent variable is whether or not multiple paramilitaries were shot dead in an incident 
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(1=more than one fatality; 0=one fatality).  Separate models include the total number of persons 
killed between incidents (Models 1 and 3) and the total number of members of the security forces 
killed between incidents (Models 2 and 4).  
The results across all four models show a significant effect for the 1982 Northern Ireland 
Assembly election.  The likelihood of a covert operation perpetrated by the security forces in 
which republican paramilitaries were shot dead increased significantly after the election (Models 
1 and 2, p < .001).  Similarly, the likelihood that multiple paramilitaries were shot dead in a 
single incident increased significantly after the election (Models 3 and 4, p < .01).  Based on 
Models 1 and 2, after the election it also became significantly less likely that there would be a 
fatal covert operation in Belfast or Derry city (p < .01).  In Models 3 and 4, the urban or rural 
nature of the incidents was not significant, although the direction of the coefficients is negative.   
Controlling for the other variables, the total number of persons killed and the number of 
security forces killed are insignificant across all four equations.  These findings suggest that 
changes in the level of violence did not directly influence incidents in which republican 
paramilitaries were shot dead by the security forces. Similarly, the number of alleged informers 
killed did not directly influence incidents in which republican paramilitaries were shot dead.  
 Because coefficients are expressed in terms of the logged odds of the dependent variable 
and are non-linear in logistic regression models, their substantive interpretations are not 
straightforward (Long and Freese 2014, pp. 133-84).  To better understand the influence of the 
Assembly election and the influence of geography on what appear to be shoot-to-kill operations, 
we generated their predicted marginal probabilities based on the findings for Model 1.  Based on 
the predicted marginal probabilities, prior to the election there was a 26% chance that a covert 
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operation with fatalities would occur in a rural area or small town but after the election there was 
an 84% chance that a covert operation with fatalities would occur in a rural area or small town. 
 It is unclear why the alleged shoot-to-kill incidents were more likely to occur in rural 
areas and small towns.  Control of political violence may be easier in the limited space of urban 
areas.  And by 1982 the security forces may have effectively contained republican violence in 
Derry city and Belfast and intentionally chose to focus on the countryside, especially along the 
border with the Republic of Ireland which offered a potential safe-haven for paramilitaries.  
However, as shown in Map 1, relatively few of the covert incidents that occurred between 1982 
and 1992 were along the border with the Republic of Ireland, and there were incidents in Belfast 
and Derry city. 
[MAP 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 A crosstabulation of persons killed by republican paramilitaries by geographic location 
suggests that the violence in Belfast and Derry city was never contained.  As shown in Table 3, 
lethal republican activity in these cities increased relative to 1980 (as a percentage of total 
persons killed by Irish republicans) and then decreased in Belfast between 1983 and 1986.
12
  
The decrease in Belfast, however, was caused by internal decisions made by the Belfast IRA and 
not the successes of the security forces.  As part of Sinn Féin’s mobilization and the decision to 
contest elections, it is well-documented that the Belfast leadership diverted funds to Sinn Féin 
and limited operations that might alienate voters (see Moloney 2007, pp. 242-45, 287-97, 328; 
English 2003; see also, Neumann 2006, pp. 959-64).  This led to a schism in Belfast that was a 
precursor to a split in the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin in the autumn of 1986.  By significantly 
increasing Provisional IRA activity in Belfast in 1987, the leadership demonstrated their 
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commitment to pursuing a military campaign while also embracing constitutional politics via 
Sinn Féin. 
  There may also be a geographic explanation of this finding.  Implementing a shoot-to-
kill policy in a rural area may be more attractive because there are likely to be fewer witnesses 
and it is easier to conceal a team of soldiers or police officers in the countryside.  Alternatively, 
there may be a higher likelihood of civilian casualties in an urban area.  Different responses to 
informers may have influenced the geography of incidents.  Of 29 alleged informers executed by 
republican paramilitaries between 1982 and 1992, seven were from Belfast and five were from 
Derry city, but only two were from Tyrone.  Between 1982 and 1992, 23 members of the 
Provisional IRA’s “Tyrone Brigade” were shot dead in 11 incidents. 
 The key finding from our quantitative analyses is that after the 1982 Assembly election 
there was a significant increase in covert incidents in which Irish republican paramilitaries were 
shot dead and there was a significant increase in incidents with multiple fatalities.  These 
findings are consistent with allegations that the authorities adopted a shoot-to-kill policy 
following the 1982 Assembly election.  Because this is a controversial interpretation of the 
findings, we considered alternative explanations.  There is the possibility that in the early years 
of the conflict paramilitaries were more likely to operate as individuals and in small groups but 
in the later years they were more likely to operate in battle teams or cells.  This might account for 
an increase in multiple fatality incidents. However, data presented in Table 4 rule out this 
explanation. 
 The IRA reorganization was in place by December 1977 and after this the size of active 
service units should have been relatively constant.
13
  Table 4 presents information on incidents 
in which republican paramilitaries were shot dead in the post-reorganization era.  Consistent with 
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the findings, the monthly rate of total incidents, of covert incidents, and of multiple fatality 
incidents is greater after the Assembly election.  The results in Table 2 are not a function of 
republican paramilitary organizational changes in 1976-77.
14
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 A quasi-experimental/“difference-in-difference” design (Angrist and Pischke 2008; Cook 
and Campbell 1979) allowed us to assess the possibility that the increase in republican 
paramilitaries killed was caused by a more general and aggressive approach by the security 
forces in the 1980s. Drawing on data from Malcolm Sutton’s Bear in Mind These Dead (1994) 
and the CAIN Web Service, Table 5 compares the annual number of civilians killed by the 
security forces with the annual number of republican paramilitaries killed by the security 
forces.
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 Over a 24-year period, the security forces killed 7.71 civilians and 6.04 republican 
paramilitaries per year.  Comparing 1969-81 with 1982-92, however, shows a large decrease in 
the number of civilians killed and a smaller decrease in the number of paramilitaries killed, per 
year, in the years after the 1982 Assembly election.  Over time, the security forces became more 
careful in their counterinsurgency.  If we exclude the early and radically more turbulent years of 
the conflict, comparing 1974-81 with 1982-92, the data are even more revealing—in the post-
election era there was a decrease in civilian deaths per year (5.25 versus 3.27) but an increase in 
republican paramilitary deaths per year (4.2 versus 5.0).  Comparing the three years prior to the 
election (1979-81) with the next three years (1982-84), the data are consistent with the view that 
a shoot-to-kill policy was implemented in 1982.  Between 1979 and 1981 (which includes the 
tumultuous period of the  hunger strikes), the security forces killed nineteen civilians and six 
paramilitaries. Between 1982 and 1984, they killed sixteen civilians and nineteen paramilitaries. 
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Whether or not there was a shoot-to-kill policy, after the Assembly election the security forces 
became more aggressive when confronting republican paramilitaries. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 Consistent with the view that a shoot-to-kill policy was implemented, our findings show 
that there was a qualitative change in the nature of counterterrorism in Northern Ireland after the 
1982 Assembly election.  Independent of the findings in Table 2, the findings in Tables 3, 4, and 
5 confirm this change.  A detailed examination of covert incidents between 1982 and 1992 also 
suggests that a shoot-to-kill policy was implemented. 
 
The Politics of Shoot-to-Kill 
Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 underestimate the complexity of British counterterrorism in Northern 
Ireland.  Alleged shoot-to-kill operations were undertaken by three different organizations—the 
RUC’s E4A Special Support Unit, and the British Army’s Special Air Service and 14th 
Intelligence Unit—in the same environment in which there was routine policing by the RUC 
while other segments of the British Army and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) concurrently 
provided support and their own counterterrorism efforts.  Paramilitaries could be shot dead in a 
variety of circumstances.  As an example, on 6 February 1992, an IRA unit ambushed an off-
duty and part-time member of the UDR.  The soldier, who was seriously wounded, shot dead one 
of the paramilitaries (McKittrick et al. 2004, p. 1280).  This incident is similar to several of the 
pre-election incidents and unlike many of the alleged shoot-to-kill incidents. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 In order to better understand the republican paramilitary-security force dynamic in the 
post-Assembly election era, we begin with Table 6 which presents information on a subset of 21 
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covert incidents in which the RUC’s E4A Unit, and the British Army’s 14th Intelligence Unit 
and Special Air Service (SAS)  shot dead republican paramilitaries (Matchett 2016, pp. 222-30).  
Between July 1970 and the election in October 1982, there were 77 incidents in which 85 
republican paramilitaries were shot dead by the security forces (85/77=1.10 fatality per event).  
In the post-election period there were 29 incidents in which 55 paramilitaries were shot dead, 
which was a statistically significant increase in fatalities per incident (85/77=1.10 vs. 
55/29=1.90; p<.001).  As shown in Figure 1, a subset of 21 of these incidents producing 48 
fatalities was even more deadly, with an average of more than two fatalities per event (48 
fatalities /21 incidents=2.28).  The primary victims were members of the Provisional IRA, who 
lost 40 members in 16 incidents. The primary perpetrators were members of the British army’s 
Special Air Service (SAS) who killed 36 paramilitaries in 14 incidents. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Figure 1 divides the subset of 21 incidents into four distinct time periods: Period 1) 
November 1982—autumn 1983, during which the first three incidents raised public concern that 
there was a shoot-to-kill policy, Sinn Féin benefitted from the public outcry, and — if there was 
a shoot-to-kill policy — it thus appears that a decision was made to switch implementation from 
the RUC to the British Army; Period 2) autumn 1983—spring 1985, during which the British and 
Irish governments began negotiating the Anglo-Irish Agreement and (consistent with the 
presence of our latent variable) incidents that could be perceived as shoot-to-kill operations 
temporarily ended; Period 3) spring 1986—autumn 1988, when the British government put 
forward a series of initiatives designed to curtail Sinn Féin and again what could be perceived as 
shoot-to-kill operations were temporarily ended; and, Period 4) spring 1990—November 1992, 
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during which the British and Irish governments were both involved in secret negotiations with 
republicans that led to a Provisional IRA ceasefire. 
 Period 1: November 1982—Autumn 1983   
The first three incidents here occurred in quick succession—two in November 1982 (11th and 
and 24th of the month) and the third on 12th December 1982.  All three incidents occurred in 
North Armagh, involved the same RUC E4A team, and for each there was evidence of 
preplanning.  In the second incident, for example, the E4A team staked out an arms dump in a 
hay shed.  After two curious teenagers entered the shed they were shot by the E4A team; one 
teenager was killed, the other seriously wounded (McKittrick, et al. 2004, pp. 920-21, 926, 929-
930; Murray 1990; Rolston 2000). The fourth incident, on 2 February 1983, was very different. 
Two members of the INLA who were moving a weapon from one location to another in Derry  
confronted a person following them.  It was an undercover member of the British Army’s Special 
14th Intelligence Unit who shot dead one of the INLA operatives and wounded the other 
(McKittrick et al. 2004, p. 936). 
 By the time of the fourth incident, the first three incidents had raised widespread concern 
that RUC officers were sidestepping due process and executing suspected paramilitaries.  Such 
allegations caused problems for the authorities, and played into Sinn Féin’s argument that the 
criminal justice system was compromised in Northern Ireland.  In June 1983, Gerry Adams, was 
elected MP for West Belfast, andSinn Féin’s overall vote increased to 43% of the nationalist 
electorate. 
 The state’s response to the continued rise of Sinn Féin and the public outcry over alleged 
shoot-to-kill incidents was multi-faceted, and seemingly consistent with the “rule of law.”  In 
liberal democracies police officers, coroners, and prosecutors are public officials who to some 
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degree are held accountable by journalists, elected representatives, and the public. In September 
1983, the Director of Public Prosecution opened an inquiry into the first three incidents and 
police officers involved were charged with murder.  In court, testimony outed an informer and 
revealed that RUC officers had lied to cover their activities.  In a controversial decision, the 
officers were acquitted in April 1984, but the revelations led to an embarrassing investigation of 
the RUC directed by John Stalker of the Greater Manchester Police, beginning in May 1984 
(Stalker 1988).  If there was a shoot-to-kill policy, it appears that at some point in 1983 a 
strategic decision was made to shift operations from the RUC to the British Army, especially the 
Special Air Service (SAS) (see also Bew 2014).  Following the third incident in this period, RUC 
E4A officers did not shoot dead another republican paramilitary until 10 April 1991.   
 Period 2: Autumn 1983—Spring 1985 
The role of a police force, even a militarized force like the RUC, is very different from the role 
of an army that is trained to use deadly force to defend a state and prosecute war.  The fifth 
alleged shoot-to-kill incident (4 December 1983) was very similar to the first three but with one 
important change—two IRA members were shot dead by the SAS as they approached an arms 
dump hidden in a hedge.  In contrast to the aforementioned trial of RUC officers, the initial 
inquest into this incident was adjourned because three of the SAS soldiers involved did not 
appear.  When the inquest reconvened, the only soldier from the SAS unit directly involved in 
the shooting who did appear in court had not actually witnessed the shooting (see Murray 1990, 
pp. 292-95; Tíghrá 2002, pp. 256-57).  Alleged shoot-to-kill operations, as led by the SAS, 
continued until the tenth such incident, on 23 February 1985.  After this, they stopped for more 
than a year.  
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 Political moderates were threatened by the growth of Sinn Féin and shoot-to-kill 
allegations,which undermined nationalist faith in the political system in Northern Ireland.  The 
Irish government sought a role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, which they believed would help 
the SDLP and also assuage nationalist concerns.  The British government, led by Margaret 
Thatcher, initially resisted but, faced with ongoing violence coupled with the rise of Sinn Féin, 
agreed to negotiate with the Irish government.  The negotiations culminated with the signig of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in November 1985, which gave Dublin a formal political role 
in Northern Ireland, including a voice on security policy. As shown in Figure 1, from November 
1982 to February 1985, there was roughly one alleged shoot-to-kill incident every 11-12 weeks 
(119/10=11.9).  After this, for the 38 weeks prior to the signing of the AIA, and for 23 weeks 
thereafter, there were no alleged shoot-to-kill incidents.  If there was a shoot-to-kill policy, it 
seems to have been suspended in order to support the AIA process. 
 Period 3: Spring 1986—Autumn 1988 
Covert operations in which Irish republican paramilitaries were killed re-started in the spring of 
1986, with the eleventh such incident on 26 April 1986, and continued until 30 August 1988, 
which witnessed the fourteenth such incident. Accounts show that the security forces had 
advance warning of the republican operations leading to these incidents (e.g., Murray 1990, pp. 
365-68; 376-84, 396-409; 439-48).   
The twelfth incident in this period is particularly important because it clearly 
demonstrated a commitment to kill rather than arrest paramilitaries.  On 25 April 1987, an IRA 
bomb killed Sir Maurice Gibson, the Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland, and his wife.  In 
their statement claiming responsibility, the IRA specifically mentioned that it was Gibson who 
had acquitted RUC officers accused of murdering their comrades in what was seen as the first 
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shoot-to-kill  incident in November 1982. 16 Two weeks after Gibson’s death, on 8 May 1987, the 
Provisional IRA’s East Tyrone Brigade set out to bomb what they believed was an unstaffed, 
part-time police station at Loughgall, North County Armagh.  The security forces acquired 
advance warning, but instead of taking steps to arrest those involved they set up an ambush.  
When the IRA team began their attack they were met with five minutes of continuous fire in 
which the SAS shot an estimated 1,200 rounds.  Eight paramilitaries were killed.  Two civilians 
were also wounded, one fatally.  Each of the IRA casualties had a head wound, including two 
paramilitaries who were shot fleeing from the scene. The SAS also fired without warning on the 
vehicle carrying the civilian casualties (Magee 2011, p. 3490; McKittrick et al. 2004, pp. 1077-
1080; Murray 1990: 380-83; Urban 1996: 227-37).  The authorities expressed regret over the 
civilians targeted, but not the paramilitaries.  The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
commented, “Those who launch such attacks have to face the consequences” (Rolston 2000, p. 
130). 
 One interpretation of the next (third) incident in this time period (and thirteenth overall) 
is that it demonstrates official endorsement of shooting suspected terrorists dead instead of 
arresting them.  Based on information that the IRA was planning a bombing attack in Gibraltar, 
Prime Minister Thatcher approved deploying an SAS team.  On 6 March 1988, three suspected 
IRA members known to the authorities were spotted crossing the Spanish-Gibraltar border.  
About an hour later, the suspects were heading back toward the border when they were 
confronted and killed by the SAS.  The British government released a statement that there had 
been a “fierce gun battle”, but the SAS team was flown 1,500 miles back to England before they 
could be interviewed by the Gibraltar police.  The government subsequently acknowledged that 
the three “terrorists” were unarmed, but the soldiers involved claimed that the deceased had 
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made movements that were threatening.  Witnesses contradicted this and stated that two of three 
deceased had their hands in the air when they were shot (McKittrick et al. 2004, pp. 1112-16; 
Murray 1990; Rolston 2000, pp. 155-74).  The Gibraltar event remains one of the most 
controversial of the alleged shoot-to-kill incidents. 
 The final such incident during this period (and fourteenth overall) is important because it 
seemingly demonstrates a complex relationship between alleged shoot-to-kill incidents and other 
repressive measures.  On 20 August 1988, an IRA bomb killed eight British soldiers near 
Ballygawley, in County Tyrone.  The state’s response was both immediate and long-term.  Ten 
days after Ballygawley, in “a carefully planned ambush”, the SAS shot dead three members of 
the Tyrone IRA who they suspected had been involved in the bombing (McKittrick et al. 2004, 
pp. 1143-44; Patterson 1997, p. 211).  And over the course of the next year, the British 
government engaged in “smart repression” against Sinn Féin (see also, Smithey and Kurtz 
2018a, pp. 185-86).  Their goal was to undercut the growth of Sinn Féin and force the party into 
a more moderate and constitutional direction while simultaneously limiting “backfire” from 
people worried that the government was taking steps to deny fundamental civil liberties (see also 
O’Leary and Silke 2011). 
 In the autumn of 1988, the Thatcher government restricted the press by introducing a 
broadcasting ban on statements from persons who supported proscribed organizations, restricted 
a suspect’s right to silence in Northern Ireland, (allowing judges in non-jury courts to “draw 
inferences” of incrimination if alleged paramilitaries remained silent when questioned), and 
restricted free speech by making it a criminal offense for candidates and elected officials to 
express support for proscribed organizations.  Although there was generally broad support in 
parliament for the government’s approach to the conflict in Northern Ireland, this package of 
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measures was controversial and met with opposition from the Labour Party and civil libertarians 
(Cunningham 2001, pp. 60-61; Thatcher 1993, pp. 411-15).  In combination with other features 
of the state counterterrorism campaign, they were also effective.  Sinn Féin’s vote fell in the 
1989 local elections, and during the 85 weeks (approximately 20 months) folllowing the 
fourteenth such incident, there were no alleged shoot-to-kill incidents in Northern Ireland.   
 Period 4: Spring 1990—November 1992 
After the above mentioned legal restrictions were in place, more incidents occurred that revived 
allegations of a shoot-to-kill policy.  Between 18 April 1990 (the fifteenth such incident) and 25 
November 1992 (the final incident) there were six such incidents over 31 months, averaging 
approximately one every five or six months (31/6=5.1; one incident every 22 weeks). 
 Political dynamics are also evident in the ending of such incidents.  By the time of the 
final incident, the British and Irish governments were both involved in secret negotiations with 
the IRA. In 1992, republican paramilitaries killed 42 people, and there were two alleged shoot-
to-kill incidents by the security forces, who killed nine people overall.  In contrast, in 1993 
republican paramilitaries killed 39 people, but there were no alleged shoot-to-kill incidents and 
indeed, for the first time since 1968, the security forces killed no one.  Between 1 January 1994 
and the start of the Provisional IRA ceasefire on 31 August, republicans killed 27 people, but 
only one fatality was attributed to the security forces, of a man who died from injuries sustained 
more than a decade earlier (McKittrick et al. 2004, pp. 1345-46, 1475).  What did not happen in 
1993 and 1994 is consistent with the notion that a shoot-to-kill  policy was suspended in order to 





In Northern Ireland, a key aspect of the government’s counterterrorism strategy was the 
argument that republican paramilitaries were criminals. Sinn Féin’s success in the 1982 Northern 
Ireland Assembly election undermined that argument and showed the potential of a “dual 
military/electoral strategy” for republicans (Smith 1995, pp. 219, 161-94; Patterson 1997, p. 193-
95).  Our contention is that British elites saw this as a serious threat that had to be countered. 
Quantitative analyses show that after the election there was a statistically significant increase in 
covert security force incidents in which republican paramilitaries were shot dead, and a 
significant increase in incidents in which multiple republican paramilitaries were shot dead.  
These results are consistent with the notion  that a shoot-to-kill policy was implemented 
following the 1982 Assembly election.  Indeed, whether or not there was a shoot-to-kill policy, it 
is clear that the nature of the republican paramilitary-security force dynamic changed 
significantly in 1982. 
 Mark Urban writes that the “key role in advocating ambushes [was] played by middle-
ranking police and army officers” and that the attitude of top-level police and military officers 
was “one of acceptance than of initiating a wave of ambushes” (1992, 241; see also Neumann 
2003, pp. 107, 131, 144).  Our view is that top-level police and military officers, and British 
political elites, did more than accept what was happening.   
 In the context of the Assembly election, RUC E4A officers on their own initiative 
probably started the tit-for-tat targeting of suspected paramilitaries (see also Balian and Bearman 
2018).  In the first incident (October 1982), the victims were prime suspects for an attack that 
killed three RUC members two weeks earlier.  The third incident (12 December 1982), in which 
two INLA volunteers were killed, occurred a week after an INLA bomb killed eleven soldiers 
and six civilians.  But what accounts for the end of such incidents involving the RUC and the  
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transition to similar incidents involving the British army amidst a storm of public concern and 
the continued growth of Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA?   
 It is possible that, on their own initiative, middle level SAS officers followed the RUC’s 
lead and adopted a shoot-to-kill policy.  And three of the relevant SAS incidents also have tit-
for-tat aspects to them.  In September 1983, Seamus Campbell was one of 19 IRA members to 
escape from Long Kesh high security prison; the escape was a major political embarrassment.  
Three months later, his brother, Brian Campbell, and Colm McGirr were shot dead in what was, 
overall, the fifth such incident, but the first involving the SAS (December 1983). They were the 
first IRA members shot dead after the Long Kesh escape. The IRA killed Justice Gibson on 27 
April 1987. The Loughgall ambush occurred two weeks later.  On 20 August 1988, an IRA bomb 
at Ballygawly, Tyrone, killed eight British soldiers. Ten days later, three IRA members 
suspected of involvement in the Ballygawly attack were killed in an SAS ambush.  Newspapers 
referred to the killings as “direct revenge” (McKittrick et al. 2004, pp. 1143-44; see also Magee 
2011, pp. 383-401; Van Der Bijl 2017, p. 179; Murray 1990, pp. 377-79, 439-40).  Without 
question, however, sending the SAS to Gibraltar and withdrawing them immediately after the 
incident there was decision made at the highest level (Murray, 1990, p. 410-13).  Perhaps most 
telling, for extended periods at highly politically sensitive times (Feb 1985-April 1986; August 
1988-April 1990; November 1992-August 1994) there were no such incidents, even though 
republican paramilitaries remained active throughout.  Either conditions were such that the 
security forces did not have any opportunities to directly confront the paramilitaries during these 
time periods or, more likely, there was some political influence or consideration in the stopping 
and starting of such operations.     
 26 
 In summary, we believe that that there was a shoot-to-kill policy and that it unfolded in 
the following way.  Sinn Féin’s dramatic success in the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election 
threatened the status quo to such an extent that RUC officers on the ground and seeking revenge 
for republican attacks initiated a shoot-to-kill strategy of their own accord.  Either soldiers on the 
ground or higher up the chain of command then transferred this strategy to the SAS and the 
British Army’s 14th Intelligence Unit.  Once it was in place, we believe that British political and 
military elites then pursued and controlled the policy for their own ends.  Ultimately, we cannot 
prove or disprove the hypothesis that the security forces pursued a shoot-to-kill policy in 
Northern Ireland.  However, our findings are consistent with the argument that such a policy was 
adopted following the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Our analyses suggest that liberal states, when necessary, will systematically side-step the rule of 
law when confronting anti-state protest (Morgan and Smith 2016; Bennett 2010).  This finding 
has implications for social movement theory.  Scholars of social movements assume that 
contention lies on a continuum.  At one extreme are non-violent political activities like voting 
and leafletting and at the other extreme is political violence.  These may be different behaviors, 
but they are all political behaviors (Gamson 1990 [1975]; Tilly 1978; Tilly and Tarrow 2007, pp. 
9-11, 69-87, 136-61; Demirel-Pegg 2014).  Based on this case study, scholars should assume 
something similar with respect to state repression.  At one extreme is “soft repression”, including 
measures designed to intimidate those involved in protest, such as the police asking for the 
names and addresses of people attending a rally.  At the other extreme is “hard” and deadly 
repression that ignores due process and civil liberties (Earl 2003; Kurtz and Smithey 2018b). 
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 Our findings are qualified because they are restricted to the repression of anti-state 
insurgents.  In Northern Ireland, the state’s response to anti-state violence was different from its 
response to pro-state violence (White 1999).  There are, for example, no allegations of a systemic 
shoot-to-kill policy directed at pro-state loyalists, even though they were responsible for almost 
1,000 fatalities. The literature on repression would benefit from additional examination of the 
pro-state paramilitary-security force dynamic.  
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Table 1: Geographic Distribution of Incidents 
Location  
     Event 
     Count 
Belfast  53 
Derry  16 
Armagh  2 
Downpatrick  1 
Dungannon  1 
Newry  1 
Strabane  2 
County Antrim  1 
County Armagh  11 
County Down  2 
County Fermanagh  4 
County Tyrone  11 
Gibraltar  1 
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LR chi2 (4) 43.82 43.51 18.68 18.86 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Cox & Snell R2 0.34 0.34 0.16 0.16 
 
* < .05,  ** p < .01, *** p < .001 






Map 1: Geographic Distribution of 20 Covert Incidents in which Irish Republican Paramilitaries 
were shot dead in Northern Ireland (1982-1992). Basemap Source: ESRI, Digital Globe, 
GeoEge, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGA, AeroGrid, IGN, and the GIS 
User Community.
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Table 3: Persons Killed by Irish Republican Paramilitaries, 1978-
1992. Source: Malcom Sutton, CAIN Archive: 
https//cain.ulster.ac.uk/sttuon/chron/index/html 
 Belfast and Annual Percentage Belfast Derry  
 Derry Total Belfast & Derry Only Only  
 
1978 18 63 29% 14 4  
1979 28 102 27% 26 2  
1980 16 51 31% 13 3  
1981 28 71 39% 22 6  
1982 26 83 31% 18 8  
1983 10 61 16% 5 5  
1984 9 48 19% 6 3  
1985 11 48 23% 5 6  
1986 10 40 25% 7 3  
1987 27 71 38% 21 6  
1988 25 70 36% 21 4  
1989 10 54 19% 7 3  
1990 11 52 21% 10 1  
1991 26 50 52% 23 3  
1992 14 40 35% 12 2  
Total 269 904 30% 210 59  
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Table 4: Frequency of Shoot-to-Kill Incidents and the IRA Reorganization (December 1977  
 Incidents Covert Incidents Multiple Fatalities 
January 1978- October 1982 (58 months) 10 5 2 
Monthly Rate 1 every 5.8 months 1 every 11.6 months 1 every 29 months 
    
November 1982- November 1992 (121 months) 28 21 13 
Monthly Rate 1 every 4.3 months 1 every 5.8 months 1 every 9.3 months 
    
Total Incidents (179 months) 38 26 15 
Average Rate 1 every 4.7 months 1 every 6.9 months 1 every 11.9 months 
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Table 5: Civilian and Republican Paramilitary Fatalities Caused by the Security Forces 
(1969-92). Source: Malcolm Sutton Index,CAIN Archive: 
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/chron/index.html 
  1969-1981 1969-1981 1982-1992 1974-1981 
Year Civilians 
Republican  
Paramilitaries  Civilians 
Republican  
Paramilitaries  Civilians 
Republican  




1969 9 0 9 0         
1970 5 0 5 0     
1971 36 9 36 9     
1972 44 33 44 33     
1973 13 15 13 15     
1974 6 8 6 8   6 8 
1975 3 3 3 3   3 3 
1976 8 5 8 5   8 5 
1977 3 5 3 5   3 5 
1978 3 6 3 6   3 6 
1979 1 1 1 1   1 1 
1980 6 1 6 1   6 1 
1981 12 4 12 4   12 4 
1982 6 6   6 6   
1983 6 5   6 5   
1984 4 8   4 8   
1985 2 3   2 3   
1986 2 3   2 3   
1987 1 8   1 8   
1988 2 8   2 8   
1989 1 0   1 0   
1990 6 4   6 4   
1991 2 4   2 4   
1992 4 6     4 6     
Sub-
Total 
    149 90 36 55 42 33 
Total 185 145             




Table 6: Summary of 21 Covert Incidents (1982-92) with Irish Republican Paramilitary 
Fatalities 
      
Irish Republican Paramilitary Victims    
“Provisional” Irish Republican Army (IRA) 16 incidents 41 fatalities 
      
Irish National Liberal Army (INLA)  3 incidents 4 fatalities 
      
Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO) 1 incident 1 fatality 
      
Civilians    1 incident 2 fatalities* 
      
Security Forces Involved     
British Army Operations      
 
Special Air Service 
(SAS)  14 incidents 35 fatalities 
      
 14th Intelligence Unit  2 incidents 5 fatalities 
      
RUC E4A Special Support Unit  5 incidents 8 fatalities 
      
*This includes one civilian killed at 
Loughgall.    
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Figure 1: Alleged Shoot-to-Kill Incident Timeline (1982-1992) 
 










1 We recognize that viewing Northern Ireland as a “liberal democracy” is disputed in some 
quarters. For our purposes, under the Act of Union (1800), and the Government of Ireland Act 
(1920), the geographic area that is Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and it is the 
“sovereign right of Westminster” to legislate on any matter (Cunningham 2001, 1). Northern 
Irish citizens vote in United Kingdom elections and (at least in theory) their fundamental rights 
are guaranteed. We prefer the more neutral “political violence” to “terrorism” but use the latter to 
be consistent with the literature addressed and we follow Tilly’s definition of political 
violence—“any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or 
physically damaged in spite of resistance” (Tilly 1978, p. 176). Repression is defined as “efforts 
to repress either contentious acts or groups and organizations responsible for them” (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001, p. 69). 
2
 The Ulster Defence Regiment was responsible for 8 fatalities; McKittrick et al. do not 
disaggregate them. Non-Northern Irish security organizations killed six people (Van Der Bijl 
2017; Matchett 2016, pp. 198-200). Different counts of fatalities offer very similar but not 
identical counts (e.g., Sutton 1993; see also Morgan and Smith, 2016). McKittrick et al.’s Table 
18 is misleading. They include members of Cumann na mBan and Na Fianna Éireann as 
members of the Provisional IRA (see Maura Meehan and Dorothy Maguire, #149 and #150, pp. 
107-108). McKittrick et al. (2004) identify Daniel Burke (p. 436, #1064) as a civilian while 
Tírghrá identifies Burke as an “Oglach” (soldier); we include his event in our count. Eamon 
McCormick (p. 141, #236) was shot Halloween night 1971 and passed away January 16, 1972; 
we treat this incident as if McCormick was killed on the day he was shot. John Patrick Mullen 
and Hugh Heron (killed 16 October 1972) are claimed by the Provisionals and the Official IRA 
(McKittrick, et al. 2004, pp. 282-83]). We include them with the Provisional IRA (Tírghrá 2002: 
90-91).   
3 We do not address the morality of actions by either state authorities or paramilitaries 
(Shanahan 2009). Our focus is the alleged existence of a “shoot to kill” policy in Northern 
Ireland.   
4
 We also draw on Tírghra: Ireland’s Patriot Dead (2002) and Londáin Republican, 
http://londainrepub.blogspot.com/2010/01/roll-of-honour-part-ii.html (retrieved 15 August 
2018). 
5
 Our count of 140 fatalities is based on information contained in McKittrick et al. (2004) and 
Tírghrá (2002; see also notes 3 and 17). Numbers in parentheses refer to case numbers of 
McKittrick et al. (2004). Paddy Mulvenna (#933, pp. 389-90) and James Bryson (#941, p. 393) 
were shot in the same incident but died three weeks apart; we treat this as one incident on 31 
August 1973. In Models 1-4 (below) we include the incident involving civilian Michael Tighe 
(#2487, p. 926, 24 November 1982) as the RUC believed he and the other person involved were 
paramilitaries collecting weapons (see also Matchett 2016, p. 24). We include as separate 
(single-death) incidents the killing of John Dougal (#444, p. 215), a member of the Provisional 
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IRA’s Na Fianna Éireann, and David McCafferty (#448, p. 217), a member of the Official IRA’s 
Na Fianna Éireann, who were killed on 9 July 1972, in a series of incidents, under the 
assumption that each was acting as an individual activist. Because McCafferty was killed going 
to the aid of another person who was also killed, we reanalyzed Models 3 and 4 with this coded 
as a multiple death event. The results were substantively unchanged. We do not include incidents 
involving Gerald Donaghy (#253, pp. 148-49), a member of Na Fianna Éireann killed on Bloody 
Sunday, and Hugh Coney (#1221, p. 488), shot while trying to escape from Long Kesh. We 
exclude an incident in which three criminals were shot dead by soldiers while robbing a Belfast 
bookmaker (13 January 1990; #3089, p. 1191). The soldiers claimed that they believed they were 
members of the Provisional IRA, but there is a strong suggestion that they were known criminals 
under surveillance. We include an incident involving Seamus Bradley, who McKittrick (#515, p. 
240) records was killed by an “accidental discharge” but Tírghrá (2002, p. 73) and Sutton (1994) 
record as being shot by British soldiers. We also include an incident in which IRA member Jim 
Gallagher (#1692, p. 647) was shot while seated on a bus as it passed a British army base. Shots 
had been fired at the base and the soldier returned fire, killing Gallagher (who six days 
previously was released from prison) and wounding two others (Tírghrá 2002, p. 193). As a 
check, we excluded the Bradley and Gallagher incidents, re-analyzed Models 1 and 2, and 
achieved the same substantive results. 
6 Probably the closest anyone in authority came to acknowledging a shoot to kill policy is found 
in notes from a 1986 meeting on security which have Sir John Herman, the Chief Constable of 
the RUC, commenting that “important” members of the IRA “had to be targetted (sic) and 
eliminated if any real improvement was to be made in the security situation” and “terrorism 
could only be defeated by removing those who planned and organised violence.”  PRONI (Public 
Record Office Northern Ireland, CENT/1/15/40A Note of a meeting to discuss Cross-Border 
Security Co-Operation held in London on 31 October 1986), p. 4 
(http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/proni/1986/proni_CENT-1-15-40A_1986-10-31.pdf, retrieved 25 
July 2018). 
7 The RUC’s Special Branch was active from the beginning of the conflict. Until 1976, the army 
was in charge of security and intelligence efforts were relatively disorganized. Over time the 
British approach became more sophisticated. The RUC’s E4A Special Support Unit developed 
out of their Special Branch (Matchett 2016, pp. 182; 221-22; see also Morgan and Smith 2016). 
The Special Air Service (SAS) was sent to Northern Ireland in 1970 and initially played a 
support role. In 1976, it is reported, SAS units were sent to South Armagh and became directly 
involved in counterterrorism (Murray 1990: 29-30). 
8 This measure is conservative. If the security forces’ goal was to kill all republican 
paramilitaries involved in any given event, then events where one paramilitary was killed but 
others escaped would not be considered a “shoot to kill” incident. We exclude incidents 
involving loyalist paramilitaries and criminals plus four incidents when civilians were killed in 
covert operations (McKittrick et al. 2004 identification number follows each: John Boyle, #2038, 
11 July 1978; James Taylor, #2056, 30 September 1978; Frederick Jackson, #2657, 19 October 
1984; and, Kenneth Stronge, #2946, 4 July 1988). Jackson and Stronge were killed in exchanges 
of shots between the security forces and the Provisional IRA. Boyle and Taylor evidently were 
shot because they were suspected paramilitaries. We included the Boyle (#2038) and Taylor 
(#2056) incidents and re-analyzed Models 1-4; the results were substantively identical to those 
found in Table 2. 
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9 Unfortunately, we cannot construct a ratio variable of the number killed by those arrested 
and/or a ratio of the number killed by the total number of paramilitaries involved in any given 
incident. Such variables are impossible to construct given the clandestine nature of the incidents 
and the fact that in some events paramilitaries involved left the scene undetected while others 
were in the relative background, e.g., in “scout” cars.  
10
 In counting deaths between incidents, we exclude those killed in the specific incident. 
Between 10 February 1975 and 22 September 1975, there was a bilateral British-IRA Truce. We 
include the final incident prior to the truce (McKittrick et al. 2004, #1294, 512) but exclude an 
incident on 5 June 1975 in which an IRA member was shot after a sectarian attack (#1389, pp. 
545-46). For the independent variables, we do not count fatalities during the truce and re-start 
from 22 September 1975.  
11
 The incident on Gibraltar is coded as an urban incident. Alleged informers are identified in 
McKittrick et al. (2004), Matchett (2016: 47-59) and other sources. 
12
 Table 3 is calculated with data from Malcom Sutton (1994); CAIN Web Service, 
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/.  
13 In contrast to the brigade, battalion, and company structure that was in place, the Provisional 
IRA reorganization into cells probably decreased the average number of activists involved in any 
given operation.  Not every republican paramilitary shot dead by the security forces was on an 
operation. 
14
 We considered the possibility that a shoot to kill policy was adopted earlier, after the IRA 
killed 18 British soldiers and assassinated Lord Mountbatten (August 1979). Moloney (2007: 
175-78) states that these two events on the same day signaled the arrival of a revitalized IRA. 
The data suggest that if there was a shoot to kill policy, it was not implemented in 1979 or 1980, 
but after the Assembly election. In the thirty-seven months between September 1979 and 
October 1982, there were five incidents in which republican paramilitaries were shot dead (one 
incident every 7.5 months), but there was only one covert incident (with multiple fatalities). On 
28 May 1981, two republican paramilitaries were killed in Derry city by the 14th Intelligence 
Company; that is, there was one “shoot to kill”-type incident over 37 months. See also Bew 
(2014).  
15
 We draw on the Sutton (1994) data (via the CAIN Web Service) to compare paramilitary 
deaths and civilian deaths by the security forces. The 145 republican paramilitaries killed as 
enumerated by Sutton (1994) differs from our count of 140 because of decisions we made (see 
Notes 2 and 5). Sutton, for example, includes Gerald Donaghy, who was killed on Bloody 
Sunday (see Note 5) and Tobias Molloy (killed by a rubber bullet during street disturbances, 16 
July 1972) while we exclude them. Comparing McKittrick et al.’s (Table 3, p. 1476) annual 
count of total security force fatalities (less our count of paramilitaries (140)and civilians (3) shot 
dead in 106 incidents) with our count of paramilitaries and civilians killed yields essentially 
identical results. 
16
 In acquitting the officers, Gibson stated that he regarded them as “blameless”, adding they 
brought “the three deceased men to justice, in this case the final court of justice.” The remarks 
were interpreted as an endorsement of shoot to kill, which Justice Gibson denied (Magee 2011, 





We considered the possibility that such a policy ended because of increased security force-
loyalist collusion; that with more loyalist assassinations of Irish republicans there was less need 
for direct security force involvement (see Cadwallader 1993).  Between the Assembly election in 
1982 and the first Provisional IRA ceasefire in 1994, there were 22 incidents in which 24 Irish 
republicans (including Sinn Féin members) were killed by loyalist paramilitaries. From 1 
January 1990 to the ceasefire there were 14 such incidents (with 16 fatalities). However, after the 
final alleged shoot to kill incident (November 1992), there was no substantial increase in loyalist 
assassinations of republicans (see Tíghrá 2002 and Londáin Republican). Loyalist assassination 
was not a substitute for shoot to kill operations. In fact, alleged shoot to kill incidents and 
loyalist assassinations of republicans ended more than a year before the August 1994 ceasefire. 
Political sensitivities associated with behind the scenes peace negotiations may have led the 
security forces to stop providing information to loyalist paramilitaries. 
18
 We cannot determine the influence of an alleged shoot to kill incidents on republican 
paramilitary capabilities or the Provisional IRA’s ceasefire. The losses associated with such 
incidents, the ongoing violent campaign waged by loyalists that killed republican paramilitaries 
and nationalist civilians, and fatigue (in the republican leadership and its base), all contributed to 
the ceasefire decision (see White 2017, pp. 257-307).   
